Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean by Claudio E. Montenegro & Carmen Pagés
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin
American and the Caribbean
Volume Author/Editor: James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagés,
editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-32282-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/heck04-1
Conference Date: November 16-17, 2000
Publication Date: August 2004
Title: Who Benefits from Labor Market Regulations? Chile,
1960–1998
Author: Claudio E. Montenegro, Carmen Pagés
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10074401
Introduction
The economic literature has devoted considerable attention to studying
the impact of labor market regulations on labor market outcomes. How-
ever, the issue of whether some subgroups of workers bear the brunt or
enjoy the beneﬁts of such regulations has been much less studied.1 One
notable exception has been the burgeoning literature studying the eﬀect
of statutory minimum wages on youth employment. Although this subject
remains controversial, many studies have found negative eﬀects of mini-
mum wages on teenagers and young workers.2Less attention has been paid
to the issue of whether minimum wages particularly aﬀect women versus
men or unskilled versus skilled workers. One exception is the study by Lang
and Kahn (1998) for the United States, which ﬁnds that a rise in the mini-
mum wage shifts the composition of employment in the eating and drink-
ing sector from adults to teenagers and students. Neumark, Schweitzer,
and Wascher (2000) also examine the eﬀect of minimum wages across
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1. One reference in this literature is the paper by Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002) on the
eﬀect of unions’ involvement in wage setting on the relative employment of youth, women,
and older individuals.
2. Among the most recent studies, Williams and Mills (2001), Partridge and Partridge
(1998), and Bazen and Skourias (1997) ﬁnd a negative relation between minimum wages and
youth employment, while Katz and Krueger (1992), Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994), and
Card and Krueger (2000) ﬁnd no evidence of such an eﬀect.diﬀerent individuals by focusing on diﬀerential impacts of workers at dif-
ferent points in the wage distribution. They ﬁnd that although wages oflow-
wage workers increase, hours worked and employment levels decline, re-
ducing earnings for these workers.
Similarly, relatively little attention has been paid to the eﬀect that job
security provisions may have on particular subgroups of the labor force.
Two recent exceptions are the Organization for Economic Cooperationand
Development (OECD) (1999) and Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002). The
OECD (1999) reports negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant, eﬀects of
job security provisions on youth and prime-age females. Bertola, Blau, and
Kahn (2002) ﬁnd evidence that job security provisions increase the em-
ployment rates of male prime-age workers relative to the employment rates
of male older workers. They also ﬁnd evidence that job security provisions
are associated with higher employment rates for prime-age women relative
to women aged ﬁfteen to twenty-four. Instead, they do not ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on youth relative to prime-age employment rates for
male workers or in the distribution of employment across women and men.
In this chapter, we take advantage of the unusual variance in labor mar-
ket policies in Chile to examine how minimum wages and job security pro-
visions aﬀect diﬀerent types of workers. We look at the eﬀects of regula-
tions on the distribution of employment by age, and also, by skill, which
to our knowledge has not been examined before. To this eﬀect, we use a
sample of repeated household surveys spanning the period 1960–1998 and
several measures of labor market regulations across time. We make use of
cross-section and time series methods to estimate the eﬀect that these poli-
cies have on the distribution of employment and on particular subgroups’
employment rates. We are able to control for time eﬀects that aﬀect all
workers in a similar manner, as well as demographic groups-speciﬁc eﬀects
of business cycles and labor market institutions. In addition, to assess
whether our estimates are reﬂecting the eﬀect of regulations instead of the
eﬀect of some unobservable correlates, we also estimate the eﬀect of labor
policy on sectors not covered by regulations. We ﬁnd large and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the covered sectors and no eﬀects, or eﬀects going in
the opposite direction, on the uncovered sectors.
Our results indicate that labor market regulations are far from neutral.
We ﬁnd that job security provisions and minimum wages reduce the em-
ployment rates of youth and the unskilled at the beneﬁt of older and skilled
workers. We also ﬁnd opposite eﬀects of these policies on women’s and
men’s employment shares and rates. Job security provisions tend to beneﬁt
men at the expense of women, while the reverse seems to be true for an in-
crease in the minimum wage.
We then explore some explanations for these regularities and, while we
cannot fully discriminate among all of them, we are at least able to reject
some hypotheses. There is little evidence that the diﬀerential eﬀects of job
402 Claudio E. Montenegro and Carmen Pagéssecurity are driven by diﬀerences in labor supply elasticities or wage ad-
justments across subgroups. Instead, our ﬁndings suggest that job security
regulations produce unequal shifts in labor demand across groups of work-
ers. Regarding minimum wages, our results tend to ﬁt the predictions of the
competitive model for age and skill but not for gender. Contrary to our re-
sults, the competitive model predicts higher eﬀects of minimum wages for
women because they tend to earn lower wages than men.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 reviews the
arguments that predict nonneutral eﬀects of regulations. Section 7.2 de-
scribes the evolution of job security and minimum wage regulations in
Chile. Section 7.3 describes the data used in our empirical section. Section
7.4 describes the methodology implemented to estimate the eﬀects of reg-
ulations on the distribution of employment. Section 7.5 describes our re-
sults for both the distribution of employment and the overall eﬀect on em-
ployment rates. Finally, section 7.6 concludes.
7.1 Why Regulations May Aﬀect Some Workers Diﬀerently
There are a number of reasons to suspect that labor market regulations
alter the distribution of employment across subgroups. In the next two sub-
sections, we review the theoretical arguments that predict diﬀerential ef-
fects of job security provisions and minimum wages across workers ofdiﬀer-
ent age, skill level, and gender.
7.1.1 Job Security
Job security provisions are introduced to discourage ﬁrms from adjust-
ing their labor forces in the face of adverse economic conditions. However,
job security provisions also alter hiring decisions. In good times, ﬁrms hire
fewer workers because they take into account that these workers may have
to be laid oﬀ in the future, and that is costly. The overall impact of job se-
curity provisions on employment rates is undetermined because it depends
on whether the negative eﬀect on layoﬀs is oﬀset by the reduction in hiring
rates.3
Job security provisions will have diﬀerential eﬀects across subgroups of
workers if changes in legislation bring changes in hiring and layoﬀ rates
that have a larger impact on some subpopulations than on others. Lazear
(1990) conjectured that an increase in job security might act as a barrier,
preventing the entry of young workers into the labor market. This is be-
cause job security reduces job creation, and entry rates are especially high
among youth. This argument, however, does not consider that the eﬀect of
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3. See Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1991), Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (1994), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), and Risager and Sorensen (1997), among oth-
ers, for a theoretical discussion of the eﬀects of job security on employment rates.lower job creation rates can be oﬀset by lower job destruction rates—
which also tend to be large among youth. Pagés and Montenegro (1999)
suggest an argument whereby job security provisions may actually increase
young workers’ layoﬀrates. Their argument is related to the regularity that,
across countries, job security is positively related with a worker’s tenure.
Mandatory severance payments that increase with tenure change the cost
of dismissing workers with short tenures relative to workers with more sen-
iority at the ﬁrm. In this context, it is expected that job security concen-
trates layoﬀs among youth because, other things being equal, young work-
ers tend to have lower average tenures than older workers. If severance pay
increases substantially with tenure, and this eﬀect is important, job secu-
rity simultaneously reduces entry and increases layoﬀs among youth, re-
sulting in a lower employment share and lower employment rates for this
group of workers. Instead, the share of older workers in employment tends
to increase due to their relatively lower layoﬀ rates.
Similar reasoning can be used to predict the eﬀect of job security provi-
sions across gender. To the extent that women experience higher rotation
and, therefore, have lower average tenure than males at every age, high job
security will tend to concentrate layoﬀs among women. This eﬀect will
tend to reduce their employment share relative to men. However, higher
turnover rates also imply that stringent job security may be less of an issue
when hiring female workers because employers expect them to quit prior
to attaining high job security.4 In this case, employers might be more will-
ing to hire women relative to men, but also more likely to lay them oﬀ
should bad times arise. The overall eﬀect on female versus male employ-
ment rates is undetermined and remains an empirical issue.
It is tempting to extend the former argument to unskilled and skilled
workers. If unskilled workers have higher rotation and lower tenures than
skilled workers, the same reasoning applies. However, while higher female
turnover rates may be motivated by life-cycle decisions exogenous to the
employer, such exogeneity is more diﬃcult to claim when explaining the
higher rotation of unskilled workers.
The insider-outsider literature provides further arguments for why job
security may have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the employment rates of diﬀerent
subpopulations.5 According to this literature, more stringent job security
reduces the elasticity of wages to changes in the unemployment rate. When
employed workers know their jobs are insured against demand ﬂuctua-
tions, they may be less willing to accept the wage adjustments necessary to
reduce unemployment rates. This situation may help to create two kinds of
workers: insiders, who hold their jobs and have high wages; and outsiders,
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4. See Pagés and Montenegro (1999) for a more formal development of this argument in the
context of a partial equilibrium model.
5. See, for instance, Lindbeck and Snower (1988).who either are unemployed or hold temporary, part-time or ﬁxed-terms
jobs without job security.6If women, the young, and the unskilled are more
likely to be outsiders, then job security (through this wage eﬀect) will bias
employment against these groups.
Finally, diﬀerences in labor supply elasticity may contribute to diﬀer-
ential eﬀects across subpopulations, even if job security brings a uniform
change in labor demand across groups. Let us assume that an increase in
job security reduces labor demand. If women, the young, and the unskilled
have higher labor supply elasticity than the average worker, higher job se-
curity would bring a higher decline in employment for these workers than
for other groups with a lower elasticity of labor supply.7
In summary, the arguments put forth in this section suggest that youth,
and possibly women and the unskilled, bear the brunt of job security reg-
ulations.
7.1.2 Minimum Wages
The eﬀect of minimum wages on employment remains a controversial
topic. In the competitive model, workers are paid their marginal product,
and any artiﬁcial increase in the price of labor above the marginal product
therefore prices the worker out of the labor market. Conversely, models
that allow for employers’ monopsony power predict wages lower than the
marginal product, and, thus, an increase in minimum wages can increase
wages without reducing employment rates.8 In the Lang and Kahn (1998)
model of bilateral search, the eﬀects of minimum wages also diﬀer from the
expected eﬀects in the competitive model. In their model, minimum wages
aﬀect the quality of the pool of applicants to jobs. Higher minimum wages
allow ﬁrms to get better applicants for jobs, while reducing the employ-
ment prospects of less-productive workers.
On average, youth, women, and the unskilled tend to have lower wages
than older, male, or skilled workers. Therefore, because minimum wages
are more likely to be binding among these workers, the competitive model
predicts larger unemployment eﬀects for the ﬁrst group. In the imperfect
competition model, however, the eﬀects are less clear-cut. In principle, the
magnitude and sign of the minimum wage eﬀect will depend on how far
wages are from their respective marginal products in each subpopulation.
If that gap is larger in some groups than in others, an increase in minimum
wages may have “competitive” eﬀects on some groups and “noncompeti-
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6. The insider-outsider argument requires a strong union ﬁxing wages for new entrants.
Otherwise, ﬁrms could always pay very low wages at the beginning of the employment rela-
tionship to compensate for higher wages in the future. See Bertola (1990) for an analytical
study of this issue.
7. See Hamermesh (1993).
8. There are many situations that give rise to imperfect competition in the labor market,
such as monopolistic power on the part of employees, incomplete information, or imperfectly
mobile workers.tive” eﬀects on others. Given this ambiguity, the sign and magnitude of the
eﬀects become an empirical question.
7.2 Labor Market Regulations in Chile
Chile has experienced a very wide range in labor market policies, pro-
viding a privileged case scenario for analyzing the impact of regulations on
labor market outcomes. We distinguish between job security provisions
and statutory minimum wages.9
7.2.1 Job Security Provisions
Among the most interesting aspects of the Chilean experience is that, in
the thirty-nine years covered by our sample, Chile has gone from a situa-
tion of dismissal at will to a rigid labor market by OECD standards (Heck-
man and Pagés 2000). Since their inception in 1966, job security provisions
have favored full-time indeﬁnite employment over part-time, ﬁxed-term, or
temporary contractual relationships. To this end, in case of a ﬁrm-initiated
separation, labor codes regulate the following: (1) compulsory advance no-
tice periods; (2) the causes for which a dismissal is considered justiﬁed or
unjustiﬁed; and (3) severance pay related to the tenure of a worker and the
cause of dismissal. While the minimum period of advance notice has al-
ways been kept constant and equal to one month, the formula for comput-
ing severance pay and the causes for just or unjust dismissal have varied
widely over the years. This is the variance that we exploit in our empirical
work.
Table 7.1 summarizes the changes in legislation that took place in the
1960–1998 period. From 1960 to mid-1966, ﬁrms had to provide a one-
month advance notice (or pay the equivalent of one month of salary), but,
otherwise, “employment at will” was the norm. In 1966, the congress ap-
proved a new law under which ﬁrms had to pay compensation equal to one
month’s wage per year of work to all workers dismissed without just cause.
The economic needs of the ﬁrm were considered a just cause in the law, and,
therefore, a worker dismissed for this reason would not qualify for sever-
ance pay. In practice, however, workers would appeal to courts, and judges
tended to consider these dismissals unjustiﬁed (Romaguera, Echevarría,
and González 1995). In that event, the employer could choose between
paying the mandatory compensation—plus wages foregone during trial—
or reinstate the worker in his or her old post. This reform substantially in-
creased the diﬃculty and the cost of labor force adjustments.
After 1973, a violent change in political regime brought about a de facto
liberalization. Although job security provisions were not modiﬁed in the
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9. See Edwards and Cox-Edwards (2000) for an excellent summary of labor market reforms


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.law, in practice, it was more likely that judges ruled against workers, eﬀec-
tively reducing dismissal costs. In 1989 and 1981, successive modiﬁcations
reduced the cost of dismissal under the law. In 1981, the maximum amount
to be awarded to a worker dismissed without just cause was reduced to the
equivalent of ﬁve months’ pay. This reform substantially reduced the cost
of dismissal, particularly for workers with long tenures, although it only
applied to newly hired workers.
After 1984, the tide shifted and job security provisions became progres-
sively stricter. In December of that year, the law was modiﬁed to exclude
economic needs of the ﬁrm as a justiﬁed cause of dismissal. However, the
maximum amount payable to a worker was kept at ﬁve months of pay. In
1990, after the return of democracy, a new labor reform still in force fur-
ther increased the cost of dismissal. This law considers dismissals moti-
vated by the economic needs of the ﬁrm justiﬁed, but employers are still li-
able to pay compensation equal to one month’s pay per year of work, with
a maximum amount of eleven months of pay. It is the responsibility of the
ﬁrm to prove just cause. If such causality cannot be demonstrated, there is
a 20 percent surcharge in the amount of compensation.
We summarize this variance in law and court practice by means of a job
security measure derived in Pagés and Montenegro (1999).10 This measure




 i i 1(1    )[bt i   atSPjc
t i   (1   at)SPuc
t i],
where   is the probability of remaining in a job,   is the discount factor, T
is the maximum tenure that a worker can attain in a ﬁrm, bt iis the advance
notice to a worker that has been iyears with a ﬁrm, atis the probability that
the economic diﬃculties of the ﬁrm are considered a justiﬁed cause of dis-
missal, SPjc
t 1 is the mandated severance pay in that event to a worker that
has been i years at the ﬁrm, and ﬁnally, SPuc
t 1 denotes the payment to be
awarded to a worker with tenure i in case of unjustiﬁed dismissal.
This measure computes the expected cost, at the time a worker is hired,
of dismissing this worker in the future. This cost is measured in terms of
monthly wages. The advantage of this measure in respect to other mea-
sures that compute the cost conditional on having achieved a certain
tenure is that our job security measure captures the whole proﬁle of sever-
ance pay at each level of tenure. The assumption is that ﬁrms evaluate fu-
ture dismissal costs based on current law. Higher values of this variable
indicate periods of relatively high job security, whereas lower values
characterize periods in which dismissals were less costly.
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10. See the mentioned paper and Heckman and Pagés (2000) for a complete description of
the methodology used, how it is applied across time and countries, and the relative advantages
and costs of using this measure versus other measures of job security.Based on the legal information summarized in table 7.1 and assumptions
regarding  ,  , a, and T, we obtain a measure of job security (JS). We take
  to be a constant value such that the average real interest is equal to 8.4
percent, which corresponds to the average real interest rate in Chile during
the 1960–1998 period. The discount rate is computed based on the as-
sumption that without job security, turnover rates in Chile would be com-
parable to those observed in the United States.11 Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) report an average annual turnover rate of 12 percent. The probabil-
ity that a dismissal originated by the economic needs of the ﬁrm will be
considered just depends on whether the law says so and whether labor
judges rule so if workers take ﬁrms to court. For the period 1966–1984, al-
though economic needs of the ﬁrm were considered just cause in the law,
we assume ato be larger than zero and determined by the position taken by
labor courts. Finally, we assume T   25. See table 7.2 for a complete de-
scription of the parameters used in the computation of the job security
measure.
The evolution of this variable over time is depicted in ﬁgure 7.1. After
some years of relatively low employment protection, job security increases
eightfold after the introduction of compulsory severance pay in the law. Ex-
pected dismissal costs decline markedly in 1973 and then successively in
1978 and 1981. Subsequently, employment protection increases again, but
without reaching the levels attained during the late 1960s.
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11. Although turnover rates can be measured, this measure is itself aﬀected by labor law.
Given this endogeneity, we choose instead to use the U.S. turnover rate, because it is well es-
tablished that dismissal costs in the United States are very small.
Table 7.2 Parameters Used to Compute the Job Security Index
   baSPfc SPuc
1960–1965 0.92 0.88 1 1 0 0
1966–1973 0.92 0.88 1 0.2 0 (1)
1974–1977 0.92 0.88 1 0.5 0 (2)
1978–1980 0.92 0.88 1 0.8 0 (2)
1981–1984 0.92 0.88 1 0.8 0 (3)
1985–1990 0.92 0.88 1 0 0 (3)
1991– 0.92 0.88 1 0.9 (4) (5)
Notes:To compute  we use the fact that the average real interest from 1960–1998 was 8.4 per-
cent. To compute   we assume that the average Chilean turnover rate without employment
protection would be similar to the U.S. rate. According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1995), av-
erage turnover rates average 12 percent a year in the United States. (1) corresponds to one
month’s pay per year of work augmented by three months to capture the average payments in
forgone wages during trial. (2)  one month’s pay per year of work without upper limit. (3) 
one month’s pay per year of work with an upper limit of ﬁve months’ pay. (4)   one month’s
pay per year of work with an upper limit of eleven months’ pay. (5)   1.2 months of pay per
year of work with eleven months upper limit. We assume the maximum tenure a worker can
attain at a ﬁrm is twenty-ﬁve years.7.2.2 Minimum Wages
Columns (2) and (3) in table 7.3 present the hourly real minimum wage
in 1998 pesos; these indices were constructed using Chile’s Central Bank
Bulletins.12 It is interesting to note that since 1989 there has been a lower
minimum wage for workers eighteen years old or younger. This wage has
been ﬁxed at a level between 15 and 20 percent of the adult wage. Figure
7.2 summarizes the evolution of the minimum wage in relation to the aver-
age wage for teen and adult workers. The ﬁgure shows that minimum wages
are much higher, relative to each group average rate, for teens than for
adult workers. It also shows that the level of teen minimum wages has been
quite volatile relative to the average wage.
Between 1960 and 1998, adult real minimum wages increased by 186 per-
cent and teen minimum wages by 104 percent. However, because average
ages rose more than the increase in the minimum wages, minimum wages
lost ground in relation to the average wage. Despite this long-term secular
trend, Chile experienced a wide range of ﬂuctuations in minimum wages,
both in its rate of growth (in real terms) and in its level in relation to the av-
erage wage. During the 1960s, the real value of minimum wages was held
constant, but since real wages increased, the ratio of the minimum to the
average real wage declined. In the early 1970s, minimum wages increased
410 Claudio E. Montenegro and Carmen Pagés
Fig. 7.1 Job security (in monthly wages)
Source: Pagés and Montenegro (1999).



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.substantially, surpassing the growth rate of average wages. In consequence,
the ratio of the minimum to the average real wage increased sharply in that
period. From 1975 to 1980, minimum wages lost ground relative to the av-
erage wage. After the return to democracy in 1990, real minimum wages in-
creased steadily, but they continued declining relative to the average wage.
The decline was particularly sharp for the teen group, whose minimum to
average real wage rate fell from 1.80 in 1975 to 0.50 in 1998. It is interest-
ing to note that while there are several studies in the Chilean case that sug-
gest that the minimum wage is binding, others such as Bravo and Vial
(1997) suggest that it is not.13
7.3 Data
The household surveys used in this study were obtained from the Uni-
versity of Chile’s economics department. The economics department’s sur-
vey monitors the employment-unemployment status in the metropolitan
area of Santiago, Chile four times a year. Unfortunately, only the surveys
taken in June of each year contain information about wages and other em-
ployment status variables. Therefore, these are the surveys used in this
study. The format of the survey and the deﬁnition of the variables have
been kept constant since 1957, when the survey started, and so the infor-
Who Beneﬁts from Labor Market Regulations? Chile, 1960–1998 413
Fig. 7.2 Minimum to average real wages
Source: Authors’ calculations (see data section).
13. See, for instance, Castañeda (1983), Paredes and Riveros (1989), Montenegro (2002),
and Cowan et al. (2003). An excellent review of the impact of minimum wages in the case of
the United States can be found in Kosters (1996). A more recent survey on the international
evidence of minimum wages can be found in Dowrick and Quiggin (2003).mation contained in them is comparable across years.14 During the period
from 1960 to 1998, the surveys interviewed between 10,000 and 16,000
people and around 3,700 and 5,400 active labor force participants each
year. During this period, the metropolitan area of Santiago, Chile repre-
sented about one-third of Chile’s total population and a higher proportion
of gross domestic product (GDP).15 The data set is formed by stacked
cross-sectional data sets, which means that individuals are not followed
over time. The only restriction applied to our sample is that the people in-
cluded in the estimates must be at least ﬁfteen years old and no older than
sixty-ﬁve.
We merge labor policy and macrovariables taken at the annual frequency
with our individual-level annual data. We include the job security index
and the minimum wage data described in Section 2. We also include a mea-
sure of wage bargaining to control for changes in union activity that can be
correlated to our variables and to employment. While perhaps the best
measure of the inﬂuence of unions on wage determination is union cover-
age, that is, the share of workers whose wages are aﬀected by collective bar-
gaining, a time series of this nature does not exist in Chile. Because union
membership is also not available for all years covered in our sample, we
measure unions’ bargaining power by means of an index that reﬂects the
degree of centralization of collective bargaining constructed by Edwards
and Cox-Edwards (2000). This variable takes values from 1 (total decen-
tralization) to 4 (total centralization). The use of this measure is based on
the observation that union coverage tends to be larger in countries where
collective bargaining is centralized. Finally, we include as a measure of eco-
nomic activity deviations, with respect to potential GDP. To obtain this
variable, we use GDP data from the World Bank and apply a Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter to obtain trend GDP.
Table 7.3 summarizes some basic statistics of our sample, by year. The
ﬁrst three columns display the value of the job security index and the real
minimum wage for people eighteen or younger and for adult workers. The
next two columns summarize the index of bargaining (column [4] presents
the original index, and column [5] presents the smoothed index). The evo-
lution of these variables over time is depicted in ﬁgure 7.3. Higher values
of this measure, like those registered from 1960 to 1970, reﬂect periods of
higher union centralization.16 The next seven columns summarize the av-
erage hourly wage broken down by sex (columns [6] and [7]); skill level (col-
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14. In this study we use data from 1960 on, because the previous years (1957–1959) do not
have reliable data.
15. According to the 1992 census, the metropolitan area accounted for 39 percent of the to-
tal population.
16. Although not shown in the results, we checked the robustness of our results using the
strikes index constructed by Edwards and Cox-Edwards (2000) instead of the centralization
index. The results were invariant to diﬀerent speciﬁcations.umns [8] and [9]); and age group (columns [10], [11] and [12]). Column (13)
summarizes the deviation of the GDP from its potential or trend value. Fi-
nally, columns (14), (15), and (16) present the percentage of total people
employed, the percentage of people that work for someone else (wage em-
ployment), and the percentage of people self-employed as a proportion of
total population between ﬁfteen and sixty-ﬁve years old. These three rates
are also depicted in ﬁgure 7.4, which, jointly with ﬁgure 7.5 (which shows
GDP deviations from its trend), illustrates the violent swings experienced
by the Chilean economy during the 1960–1998 period, and, in particular,
between 1970 and 1985.17 Some additional indicators describing the per-
formance of the Chilean economy are summarized in table 7.4.
7.4 Methodology
To estimate the diﬀerential impact of labor market regulations across
subpopulations we assume that the employment status of an individual is
characterized by
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Fig. 7.3 Bargaining index
Source: Edwards and Cox-Edwards (2000).
Notes: Bargaining index measures the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. It takes
values from 1 to 4. Higher values indicate higher centralization of collective bargaining.
17. Chilean economic performance has been extensively documented by Edwards and Cox-
Edwards (1991, 2000), de la Cuadra and Hachette (1992), Wisecarver (1992), Bosworth,
Dornbusch, and Laban (1994), Hudson (1994), Soto (1995), and Cortazar and Vial (1998).Fig. 7.4 Employment and dependent rates
Source: Authors’ calculations (see data section).
Fig. 7.5 GDP deviation from trend































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ijt   Xit    1   X’ it   Zt    2    t   εijt,
where
yijt   1 if y∗
ijt   0
yijt   0 otherwise,
and y∗
ijt is an unobservable variable that determines whether an individual
i, in subpopulation j at time t will be employed or not, and yijt is the ob-
servable employment status of this individual. This variable takes a value
of 1 if the individual is employed and zero if it is not. In some speciﬁcations,
we focus only on wage employment (self-employment), and, therefore, this
variable takes the value of 1 if an individual is wage (self-) employed and
zero otherwise. The sample corresponds to the whole population between
ﬁfteen and sixty-ﬁve years old. In addition, Xit is a vector of variables that
summarizes the personal characteristics of the individual i at time t, Zt is a
vector of variables that vary with t,  t is a year ﬁxed eﬀect, and εijt is an er-
ror term. Among the personal characteristics, we include age, gender, skill
level, number of children, and number of children interacted with gender.
In some speciﬁcations, we also include age interacted with gender and age
interacted with skill to capture diﬀerential eﬀects of age across gender and
skill groups. Given the number of observations available, we divided the
data into three age groups (ﬁfteen–twenty-four, twenty-ﬁve–ﬁfty, and ﬁfty-
one–sixty-ﬁve) and two skill levels (nine years of education or less and
more than nine years). Adding the skill and the age groups to the gender
division, we have twelve diﬀerent subpopulations, j   1, . . . 12
In the vector of aggregate variables, Zt, we include the index of job se-
curity, deviations from GDP trend, and the union centralization variable
(all in logarithms). We also include the minimum wage index (also in loga-
rithms), but we let it change for individuals eighteen and younger. By con-
struction, the vector of coeﬃcients on the interaction of Xit and Zt,  2,
gives the sign of the diﬀerential eﬀect. In addition, assuming that the
Prob(y∗
ijt   0) is distributed as a standard normal distribution, the size of
the marginal diﬀerential eﬀect is given by  ( )Xit 2, where  ( ) is the nor-
mal density function.
Although speciﬁcation (1) is a reduced form equation, in some cases it
will be useful to add a measure of wages. To construct this variable, wijt, we
assign to all workers i j, j 1, . . . , 12, at period t, the average wage of all
employed workers in group j at period t.
Our original intention was to estimate
(1 ) y∗
ijt   Xit    1   X’ it   Zt    2   Zt    3   εijt.
With such a speciﬁcation we could recover the total marginal eﬀect of a
labor policy on subpopulation jas  ( )(Xit 2  3). However, despite ﬁnd-
ing robust estimates for the diﬀerential eﬀects, our estimates for the level
Who Beneﬁts from Labor Market Regulations? Chile, 1960–1998 419eﬀect ( 3) proved to be extremely sensitive to the set of variables included
in Zt, suggesting that our time variables did not properly account for the
time variation of the series. In view of these results, we opted for estimat-
ing speciﬁcation (1). This estimation still allows us to compute marginal
eﬀects, but the total eﬀects are now absorbed by the constant term. There-
fore, we can measure the impact of labor market regulations on the distri-
bution but not on the level of employment. Nonetheless, estimating equa-
tion (1) instead of (1 ) oﬀers substantial advantages from an econometrics
point of view. It allows controlling for macroeconomic trends and cycles as
well as policy changes and other unobservable variables that are common
to all individuals and that could be correlated to employment and labor
market regulations and bias the estimation. In addition to the inclusion of
time variables, we minimize the risk of omitted variable biases and spuri-
ous correlations in four additional ways.
First, by using individual data from a series of stacked household sur-
veys to estimate speciﬁcation (1), we can control for changes in the relative
size of the population of each group and changes in fertility, which, if omit-
ted, could bias our estimates. Second, by controlling for eﬀects of changes
in the business cycle (using GDP deviations from its trend) across individ-
uals (that is, including X’ it   Zt, where Zt contains the business-cycle vari-
able), we can partially control for changes in policy and institutions that
are endogenous to changes in relative employment. This is because such
movements are likely to be correlated with changes in the business cycle.
Third, by estimating the diﬀerential eﬀect of policy while including con-
temporary labor market policies and institutions, we make sure that our
measured eﬀects are not biased by the correlation between these variables
and the distribution of employment. Finally, by comparing the estimated
eﬀects on the probability of wage employment (which is covered by labor
policy) with the results on self-employment (which is not covered) once ap-
propriate pull-push factors from and to self-employment are accounted
for, we assess whether we are capturing the eﬀect of policy, or, instead, the
eﬀect of some unobservable correlate with group-speciﬁc employment.
7.5 Empirical Results
7.5.1 The Eﬀect of Job Security on the Distribution of Employment
Our results indicate that job security provisions have a diﬀerential im-
pact across demographic subgroups. In table 7.5, we report the results of
estimating our empirical speciﬁcation (1) assuming normality in the dis-
tribution of errors. The reported numbers correspond to the coeﬃcients of
the probit model, while the marginal eﬀects for selected subpopulations
of workers are reported in table 7.6. The t-tests, reported next to the coef-
ﬁcients, are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown kind




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.using the White (1980) method. Most coeﬃcients on the individual char-
acteristic variables exhibit the expected patterns: Female and older work-
ers are less likely to be employed than prime-age (twenty-six–ﬁfty) men.
Additionally, the number of children per father increases the probability of
being employed, and the number of children per mother decreases the
probability of being employed. Instead, the coeﬃcients on the variable
young and unskilled change signs across speciﬁcations.
In column (1) we report the results of interacting the job security mea-
sure with dummies for age (young and older), gender (women), and skill
level. A negative (positive) sign indicates that periods of more stringent job
security provisions are associated with a decline (increase) in the probabil-
ity of employment of a particular subpopulation, relative to the omitted
category. We ﬁnd strong age eﬀects. The coeﬃcient on the young-job secu-
rity interaction is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient
on the older-job security interaction is positive although not statistically
signiﬁcant. Our results suggest that high job security tends to bias the dis-
tribution of employment against younger workers. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant
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Table 7.6 Marginal and Total Eﬀects of Labor Market Regulations
Marginal Eﬀects Total Eﬀects
Job Security Minimum Wage Job Security Minimum Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men, 15–25, unskilled –0.066 –0.0516 –0.049 –0.0516
[0.000] [0.000]
Men, 15–25, skilled –0.0351 –0.004 –0.0181 –0.004
[0.000] [0.52]
Men, 26–50, unskilled –0.008 –0.036 0.009 –0.036
[0.001] [0.000]
Men, 51–65, unskilled –0.0035 –0.005 0.0135 –0.005
[0.620] [0.54]
Men, 51–65, skilled 0.008 0.045 0.025 0.045
[0.22] [0.000]
Unskilled –0.0343 –0.012 –0.0173 –0.012
[0.000] [0.09]
Skilled –0.015 0.044 0.002 0.044
[0.000] [0.000]
Women –0.0278 0.0463 –0.0108 0.0463
[0.000] [0.000]
Men –0.0151 –0.017 0.0019 –0.017
[0.000] [0.000]
Young –0.0394 0.0134 –0.0224 0.0134
[0.000] [0.08]
Older –0.008 0.0596 0.009 0.0596
[0.14] [0.0000]
Note: P-values of the test that the marginal eﬀects are equal to zero are reported in square
brackets.eﬀects across the skill divide. The coeﬃcient on the unskilled-job security
interaction is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that job se-
curity provisions reduce the probability of employment of unskilled work-
ers relative to skilled ones. Last, the coeﬃcient on the female-job security
interaction suggests a negative eﬀect of job security on the probability of
employment of women relative to men.
Column (2) shows the results once we control for the evolution of the
minimum wage, union activity, and deviations of GDP with respect to its
trend, as well as interaction of these variables with age, gender, and skill
dummies. The only diﬀerence with respect to column (2) is that the coeﬃ-
cient on the dummy for older workers is now somewhat larger and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that job security pro-
visions beneﬁt the employment prospects of older workers relative to
prime-age ones. In columns (3) and (4) we report the coeﬃcients resulting
from estimating the same speciﬁcation for wage employment and self-
employment separately. Our results are encouraging because they suggest
that our ﬁndings are driven by policy changes instead of by some unob-
servable factors correlated with labor policy and employment. The signs
and magnitudes of the coeﬃcients for total and wage employment are
very similar, except for the coeﬃcients on women. Instead, for self-
employment, the coeﬃcients are either not statistically diﬀerent from zero
or going in the opposite direction than for wage employment. This is the
case with the coeﬃcients on the gender and unskilled variables, which sug-
gests that more stringent job security regulations increase the probability
that women and the unskilled are employed in the self-employment sector
relative to men and the skilled.
Column (5) exhibits the results once we allow for further interactions be-
tween age, skill, and gender groups. With this ﬁner level of disaggregation
we can examine whether the impact of job security is the same across young
men and young women, or across young skilled and unskilled workers.
These additional variables not only provide a more complete description of
the eﬀects of job security on the distribution of employment, but also help
to infer the channels through which job security aﬀects that distribution.
The coeﬃcients for these additional interaction variables are all statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, and a test for their joint signiﬁcance strongly rejects the
null hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being zero.
The estimates in column (5) contain some interesting additional infor-
mation relative to the estimates in columns (1) to (4). We ﬁnd that an in-
crease in job security tends to reduce the employment probabilities of
young men relative to those of young women. However, we also ﬁnd that
this eﬀect is reversed at older ages. Thus, job security provisions seemingly
reduce the probabilities of employment of middle-aged and older women
relative to those of men in that same age group. Our estimates also suggest
424 Claudio E. Montenegro and Carmen Pagésthat an increase in job security provisions reduces the probability of em-
ployment of both skilled and unskilled youth, but the eﬀect is larger for
unskilled youth.
Finally, column (6) reports the results of estimating the same speciﬁca-
tion as in column (5), but in addition controls by the average wage of each
subpopulation group in period t. Controlling for the wage level of each
group allows us to assess whether some of the observed eﬀects are driven
by diﬀerences in wage adjustment across subpopulations. Yet the results
should be taken with caution because some wage movements may be en-
dogenous to the probability of employment. Overall we ﬁnd that holding
wages constant does not aﬀect our main results. The only coeﬃcient that
changes size and signiﬁcance is the interaction between the young un-
skilled and job security. Holding wages constant reduces the coeﬃcient
and the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect on unskilled youth (relative to more
skilled youth). Instead, most of the other coeﬃcients become larger (in ab-
solute value) than the ones reported in column (5). This suggests that more
stringent regulations are partly paid by workers in the form of lower wages.
The marginal eﬀects reported in table 7.6 correspond to the speciﬁcation
reported in column (5) of table 7.5. They are computed for diﬀerent com-
binations of the dummies for gender, age, and skill.
The results indicate that the largest adverse eﬀects are on unskilled
youth. However, the eﬀects on skilled youth are also substantial; an in-
crease of 100 percent in job security reduces the probability of employment
by 0.066 points (or 6.6 percentage points) for unskilled youth and by
0.0351 for skilled youth workers, relative to prime-age skilled workers. The
results in table 7.6 suggest that skilled prime age male workers gain relative
to all other groups with the exception of older workers. In addition, the
marginal eﬀects suggest that job security policies tend to have more ad-
verse eﬀects on women than on men.
In light of the diﬀerent theories described in section 7.2, how do we ex-
plain the results presented previously? Although we cannot totally dis-
criminate among diﬀerent theories, we are at least able to reject some hy-
potheses. The fact that most of our results remain unchanged when wages
are included suggests that the diﬀerential eﬀects presented previously can-
not be explained by diﬀerences in the elasticity of labor supply across de-
mographic groups. The only exception is the larger eﬀect on young un-
skilled workers, which seems to be driven by a higher labor supply elasticity
of this group.18 Our results also suggest that these diﬀerential eﬀects can-
not be explained by insider-outsider theories, because in that case the eﬀect
would also be through wages. Instead, our results suggest that the diﬀer-
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18. Cowan et al. (2003) ﬁnd that, in Chile, seemingly high transitions between schooling
and the labor market lead to a very elastic labor supply for the young unskilled.ential eﬀects on employment are demand driven: Changes in job security
provisions bring about changes in hiring and ﬁring rates that selectively
aﬀect diﬀerent types of workers.
A barrier-of-entry eﬀect can explain the negative impact of job security
on the employment rates of young workers relative to other demographic
groups. However, it cannot account for the estimated diﬀerences in impact
between young women and young men. One possible way to explain these
ﬁndings is to consider diﬀerences in turnover rates across groups. As dis-
cussed in section 7.2, a higher exogenous turnover rate can bring about two
eﬀects. On the one hand, workers with a higher propensity to rotate have
lower average tenures and, therefore, are more likely to be laid oﬀ in bad
times. On the other hand, higher rotation reduces expected severance pay-
ments and, therefore, increases the incentives to hire these workers. Con-
sequently, higher rotation among women can explain why job security pro-
visions aﬀect young women less than young men. It can also explain why
middle-aged and older women beneﬁt less from job security than men of
the same age.
Diﬀerences among turnover rates could also partially explain the results
for skilled and unskilled workers. Higher rotation among the unskilled
would imply lower tenure rates and higher probabilities of dismissal for
middle-aged and older unskilled workers, relative to more skilled ones.
This is consistent with the deleterious eﬀect of job security on the employ-
ment rates of middle-aged and older unskilled workers, relative to skilled
ones. Of course, the higher turnover rates among unskilled workers are less
likely to be exogenous to the decisions of employers than female turnover
rates. In consequence, a complete discussion of this eﬀect requires a model
that explains why turnover rates are diﬀerent in the ﬁrst place. This model
does not seem to be able to explain why the eﬀect on employment appears
more negative on the unskilled than on skilled youth, but as we have seen,
this eﬀect seems to be driven by a relatively more inelastic labor supply of
the latter.
7.5.2 Distribution of the Eﬀect of Minimum Wages
Table 7.5 also reports the results of interacting personal characteristic
dummies with the evolution of minimum wages over time. An increase in
the statutory wage has qualitative eﬀects on the distribution of employ-
ment across age and skill that are similar to the qualitative eﬀects of stricter
job security provisions. To account for contemporary employment policies
and economic conditions, we include measures of union activity, job secu-
rity provisions, and GDP deviations, interacted with demographic dum-
mies in all speciﬁcations in columns (2) to (6), but not in column (7). As in
other studies for developed countries, the results in column (7) suggest that
an increase in the minimum wage reduces the employment prospects of
young workers relative to older ones. We also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on the
426 Claudio E. Montenegro and Carmen Pagésunskilled. Instead, our results also indicate that minimum wage hikes may
increase the probability of employment for women relative to men.
Controlling for the subgroup eﬀects of contemporary changes in policy
and the business cycle does not alter the results reported in column (7).19
The comparison between the results obtained from the wage employment
and the self-employment speciﬁcations (columns [3] and [4]) is also en-
couraging. As with the coeﬃcients associated with job security provi-
sions, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on wage employment are very similar to
the ones obtained for total employment, while the coeﬃcients on self-
employment are not statistically signiﬁcant. All in all, these results suggest
that the eﬀects we are capturing are indeed associated with changes in pol-
icy rather than with some unobservable correlate of employment across de-
mographic groups.
In column (5) we present our results once we allow for diﬀerential eﬀects
across age-skill and age-gender categories and control for contemporane-
ous changes in policy and economic conditions. As in column (7), we ﬁnd
a negative eﬀect of minimum wages on the employment probabilities of
unskilled workers. The eﬀect of minimum wages is negative for young un-
skilled workers and not statistically signiﬁcant for young skilled ones. In-
stead, higher minimum wages tend to shift employment toward older
workers. Finally, we ﬁnd that women, and in particular the young, tend to
beneﬁt from minimum wage policies.
The former speciﬁcation assumes that the eﬀect of raising the minimum
wage is unrelated to the level of the going wage. However, it is plausible that
the eﬀect may be positively related to the distance between the statutory
and the going wage. To account for this possibility, we include average
wages, computed as described in section 7.5.20 The results reported in col-
umn (6) indicate that controlling for the time evolution of the average wage
of subpopulation j   1, . . . , 12 does not alter the results reported in col-
umns (3) to (5).
Column (2) in table 7.6 summarizes the marginal eﬀects, which give an
estimate of the magnitude of the eﬀects on diﬀerent demographic groups.
A 10 percent rise in the minimum wage reduces the employment probabil-
ity of young unskilled workers by 0.005 (0.5 percentage points). While the
eﬀects on youth skilled workers are insigniﬁcant, the results indicate an ad-
verse eﬀect on prime-age unskilled workers. This is an interesting result in
the context of a literature that almost exclusively focuses on the eﬀects on
youth workers.
While most of our ﬁndings are consistent with the competitive model,
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19. See column (3) as well.
20. Including such variables is tantamount to including a set of noncoverage adjusted, de-
mographic group-speciﬁc Kaitz ratios. However, we are not imposing the constraint that the
coeﬃcient on the minimum wage is the same as the coeﬃcient on the group-speciﬁc average
wage.some are diﬃcult to explain with this paradigm. For instance, this model
cannot explain why minimum wages tend to shift employment toward
women. One possible interpretation is that while men are able to obtain
wages that are close to the competitive ones, women’s wages are below their
marginal products. This would be consistent with the systematic wage gaps
found between observationally identical men and women and with the
asymmetric gender eﬀects of minimum wages. If wage gaps are explained
by imperfect competition in female labor markets, employers are supply
constrained when hiring women. Therefore, an increase in minimum wages
reduces the demand for male workers and increases the supply of labor for
women.
7.5.3 Total Eﬀects
In our previous results, all the estimated coeﬃcients measured the eﬀects
of labor regulations on each particular subpopulation relative to the omit-
ted category, but they did not provide information on whether the employ-
ment probabilities of the diﬀerent subgroups increased or declined in ab-
solute terms after changes in policy. In this section, we attempt to gauge the
total eﬀects of labor market policies on the probability of employment by
estimating their eﬀect on the aggregate employment rates of prime-age
skilled men (the omitted category in the speciﬁcations reported in table
7.5). To do so, we estimate the following error correction speciﬁcation:
(2)  Nt c  (Nt 1 N∗)  B1(yt yt ∗)  B2  log(W t )  B3  N  L εt,
(3) where N  ∗    0    1 log(JSt)    2 log(MW t)    3 log(Uniont),
and where Nt denotes the employment rate—that is, the employment to
population ratio—of prime-age male skilled workers in period t, N∗
 denotes
long-run equilibrium employment, yt – y∗
t denotes GDP deviations from its
trend (in logs), W t denotes average wages for prime-age skilled male work-
ers, JSt denotes the measure of job security, MW t denotes minimum wages,
Uniont denotes the index of wage bargaining, and L is the length of the
maximum lag. In expression (2), employment changes in function of previ-
ous period deviations from long-run equilibrium employment, GDP devia-
tions from its trend, and changes in wages and short-run dynamics. Ex-
pression (3) assumes that, in the long run, employment rates are a function
of labor market policies and the structure of wage bargaining.
Using aggregate time series techniques to estimate the eﬀect of policies
on the reference group allows us to model short- and long-run employment
dynamics. The ﬁrst step in the estimation of expression (2) and (3) is to test
whether the variables are stationary. The ﬁrst panel in table 7.7 reports the
results of testing for the presence of unit roots using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). The tests are speciﬁed with three lags. In those
cases in which the plot of the series indicated the presence of a time trend,
428 Claudio E. Montenegro and Carmen Pagéswe included a constant and a time trend in the speciﬁcation; in the other
cases, we included only a constant. While we can reject the unit root hy-
pothesis for GDP deviations from its trend and for changes in hourly
wages, we cannot reject nonstationarity for the lagged employment rate,
the logarithm of minimum wages, the logarithm of the job security index,
and the logarithm of union centralization. However, ADF tests on the ﬁrst
diﬀerences of these four series indicate that the hypothesis that these series
are integrated of order one, I(1), is not rejected.
Given the nonstationarity of the employment rate, expression (2) is well
deﬁned only if lagged employment deviations, with respect to the long-run
equilibrium rate, are stationary. This is equivalent to saying that the series
Nt ∗ has to cointegrate with Nt–1. The second panel in table 7.7 reports the
results of the Johansen cointegration test between N∗ and Nt–1. The likeli-
hood ratio test indicates the presence of three cointegrating equations, in-
dicating that the error correction model is well deﬁned.
Table 7.8 presents the results of estimating the error correction model
(ECM) once expression (3) has been substituted into expression (2). We
use the results of the Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) test to determine
the optimal length of the lagged endogenous variable and determine that
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Table 7.7 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
ADF Test 5% Critical
Names of the Series Symbol Speciﬁcation Statistic Value
GDP deviation from its trend y –  y∗ Constant –4.8412 –2.9472
Wage growth  (log W ) Constant –3.8514 –2.9705
Logarithm minimum wage L(Minwage) Trend –1.4709 –3.5426
Logarithm job security L(JS) Constant –2.43 –2.9472
Logarithm union centralization L(Union) Trend –2.7568 –3.5426
Lagged employment rate Nt–1 Constant –1.6736 –2.9472
First diﬀ. lagged emp. rate  Nt–1 Constant –3.0433 –2.9499
Change in log minimum wage  L(Minwage) Constant –2.5591 –2.9499
Change in log job security  L(Index) Constant –2.655 –2.9499




Likelihood Ratio Value Equations
Johansen Cointegration Test: Series: Nt–1 L(Minwage) L(JS) L(Union)
108.64 53.12 None∗∗∗
60.35 34.91 At most 1∗∗∗
24.64 19.96 At most 2∗∗
5.26 9.24 At most 3
∗∗∗Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level.
∗∗Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.L   1. We estimate the ECM with and without wages to see whether intro-
ducing wages alters our results, and we ﬁnd the results to be very similar in
both cases. Essentially, we ﬁnd that job security provisions increase the
long-run equilibrium rate of prime-age skilled male employment. This is
not totally surprising. As mentioned in section 7.2, job security provisions
increase the cost of dismissing workers with long tenure relative to the costs
of dismissing less-tenured workers, reducing the layoﬀ rate of the ﬁrst rel-
ative to the layoﬀ rate of the latter. Because prime-age skilled workers tend
to have longer tenures than other, younger, less-skilled workers, job secu-
rity provisions reduce the layoﬀ rates of prime-age skilled workers relative
to the layoﬀ rate of other demographic groups. The positive sign in the
ECM suggests that this eﬀect on the layoﬀ rate more than compensates for
the negative eﬀect of job security on employment creation. Instead, we do
not reject the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum wage does not
aﬀect the employment rate of prime-age, skilled male workers, regardless
of whether we control for the evolution of wages.
The estimated eﬀect of job security provisions and minimum wages on
the employment rate can be used to infer the total eﬀect of these regula-
tions on the employment probabilities of other demographic groups. In
order to do so, the coeﬃcients on job security provisions and minimum
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Table 7.8 Level Eﬀects on Male Prime-Age Employment
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Nt–1 –0.63 –0.66
(–3.05) (–3.24)
Deviations GDPt 0.08 0.10
(1.21) (1.48)










  Nt–1 0.277 0.239
(1.48) (1.30)
No. of observations 37 35
Adj. R2 0.16 0.23
Long-term eﬀect of JS 0.017 0.023
Long-term eﬀect of Minwage 0 0
Note: t-statistics shown in parentheses.wages, reported in table 7.8, should be divided by (minus) the coeﬃcient on
the lagged employment variable to obtain the coeﬃcients in expression (3).
They reﬂect the magnitude of the long-run eﬀect of regulations on prime-
age skilled male employment. The third and fourth columns of table 7.6
present our estimates for the total eﬀects. They are obtained by adding the
marginal eﬀect reported in the ﬁrst and second columns of table 7.6 to the
long-run elasticities obtained from speciﬁcation (1) in table 7.8.21
Thetotal eﬀects reported in columns (3) and (4) suggest that job security
provisions not only shift the distribution of employment toward older and
skilled workers, but also increase their employment rates. Instead, more
stringent job security provisions reduce the employment rates of young
workers. Moreover, job security provisions reduce employment opportu-
nities for women while increasing those of men. The magnitudes of these
estimated eﬀects are substantial. According to them, the 1990 labor re-
form, which increased our measure of job security by about one-third, re-
duced the employment rates of young unskilled male workers by 1.6 per-
centage points of the population.
We also ﬁnd nonneutral eﬀects of minimum wage spikes. Our estimates
suggest that a 10 percent increase in minimum wages reduces the proba-
bility of employment for young unskilled male workers by 0.51 percentage
points. Lastly, we ﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
raises the employment rates of women by 0.46 percentage points.
7.6 Conclusions
The eﬀect of regulations on employment is far from neutral across de-
mographic subgroups. Paradoxically, job security and minimum wage reg-
ulations appear to be detrimental to the very workers that they are supposed
to help. Our results suggest that both minimum wages and job security reg-
ulations reduce the employment opportunities of the young and the un-
skilled—and particularly unskilled youth—while promoting the employ-
ment rates of skilled and older workers. We have also found indications that
job security regulations may force some workers, particularly women and
the unskilled, out of wage employment and into self-employment. This pa-
per has only examined the eﬀects on employment. A complete analysis of
who beneﬁts and who loses from regulations would require examining the
eﬀects of regulations on the distribution of wages and beneﬁts as well.
There is an ongoing debate on whether raising minimum wages and job
security provisions have any eﬀects on aggregate employment rates. How-
ever, even if researchers concluded that job security provisions or mini-
mum wages do not have an eﬀect in the aggregate, it is important to care-
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21. The long-run eﬀect of job security on the employment rates of middle-age skilled work-
ers is computed as 0.011 divided by 0.63, which is equal to 0.017.fully consider these distributional eﬀects when evaluating their desirability.
At best, these policies will help some disadvantaged workers, although per-
haps at the expense of other poor workers. At worse, they distribute jobs
from less advantaged to better-oﬀ workers.
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